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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out how private venture capital funding affects 
employment and productivity in Norwegian portfolio companies. To test this, we analyze 
employment and productivity in the period from 1995 to 2013 in 134 Norwegian companies 
that received venture capital funding in this timespan. We use propensity score matching to 
match the portfolio firms with similar, non-venture capital backed firms. We then perform 
difference-in-differences analyses to identify how venture capital funding affects employment 
and productivity in portfolio firms.   
We find that companies backed by venture capital experience an increase in number of 
employees after the time of investment, where most of the increase occurs already in the 
investment year. The effect is persistent and significantly higher than for the matched control 
firms. Further, we find no evidence suggesting that portfolio companies grow at the expense 
of other competitors within their industry.  
Our findings also suggest that firms backed by venture capital experience a drop in 
productivity after the investment. The drop is immediate, and brings the portfolio firms down 
to lower productivity levels than their matched control firms. We find nothing indicating that 
the differences in productivity levels even out over time.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. We start by presenting the motivation and 
background for our chosen area of research. We will then formalize our research questions, 
before we give a brief summary of our main results. Lastly, we provide an overview of the 
structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Due to declining oil prices, Norway has experienced an increase in the unemployment rate 
during the past year. 80,000 people were registered as fully unemployed by the end of October 
2015, which represents an increase of 7,900 people from October 2014 (Armstrong, 2015). 
The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) expects additional 10,000 
unemployed people next year, while an unpublished report by Menon and Business Economics 
and DNV GL depicts a worst-case scenario of 200,000 lost jobs from 2014 to 2020 (Taraldsen, 
2015). It is therefore evident that Norway will be more dependent on growth in other sectors 
than the oil sector to support growth in the economy in the future.  
Entrepreneurship and innovation have been highlighted as important focus areas in terms of 
job creation. The Norwegian Government newly launched a nationwide entrepreneurship plan, 
which emphasizes the importance of facilitating entrepreneurship in order to create new jobs. 
The plan presents different initiatives worth over NOK 400 million, where easier access to 
venture capital (VC henceforth) is one of them (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 
2015). 
We think the relationship between VC and job creation is interesting, and we therefore want 
to study the effects of VC funding on employment in Norwegian portfolio firms. Do VC 
investments accelerate employment growth in start-up companies? Is the growth relatively 
higher than growth in similar non-VC backed firms? In addition, we also think it would be 
interesting to dig deeper into the net effect on employment. If VC backed firms grow, they 
might grow at the expense of other firms within the same industry. If this is the case, the net 
effect on job creation in the Norwegian economy will be ambiguous.  
In countries with relatively high levels of employment, productivity growth is one of the most 
important sources of value creation (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2013). In 
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Norway, the productivity growth has gone down in recent years, and the Norwegian 
Government has expressed that it will focus more on increasing the productivity growth 
(Jensen and Solberg, 2015). Motivated by this, we also want to study how venture capitalists 
(VCs henceforth) affect the productivity in VC backed firms.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Based on the presented background and motivation, we will try to answer the following three 
research questions: 
I) How do VC investments affect employment in portfolio firms? 
II) Does the presence of VC backed firms affect employment in competing firms? 
III) How do VC investments affect productivity in portfolio firms? 
1.3 Main Results 
First, we find that VC funding leads to an increase in number of employees in portfolio 
companies, relative to similar non-VC backed companies. Overall, VC funding contributes to 
an increase of 64 percent in the employment level in portfolio firms, and a large part of this 
arises already in the year of investment. The positive differences hold both in a short- and in 
a long-term perspective, indicating no reversal effect. When analyzing annual growth effects, 
we find that VC entry increases employment growth by 12 percentage points in the year of 
investment. In the subsequent years, we find no significant differences in growth rates between 
the two groups.  
Second, we examine whether VC backed firms grow at the expense of other companies within 
their industry. We analyze the impact of active VC backed firms on annual employment 
growth in other firms, using different measures for VC activity. In sum, we find no reason to 
claim that the presence of VC backed firms has negative effects on employment growth in 
other, non-VC backed firms.   
Third, we find that portfolio firms experience a significant drop in productivity after VC entry, 
relative to similar non-VC backed firms. Overall, VC funding contributes to a decrease in 
productivity levels of 37 percent. The negative differences between the two groups are evident 
both in a short- and long-term perspective, and the drop appears already in the year of 
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investment. When analyzing growth effects, we find that the productivity growth drops by 27 
percentage points in the year of VC entry. However, we find no clear differences in growth 
rates beyond this point. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
In chapter 2, we provide a summary of previous research related to our chosen topic. Chapter 
3 contains a description of private equity and venture capital, and chapter 4 presents theory of 
why VC backed companies may perform better than other companies. In chapter 5, we provide 
a presentation of our dataset. Here, we describe our sources of data, as well as how we identify 
VC backed companies and their matched control firms. In addition, we present biases that we 
believe are relevant for our research. Chapter 6 presents the methodology we use to answer 
our research questions. In chapter 7, we present and interpret our results. Chapter 8 contains a 
summary of our results, limitations of our thesis and suggestions for further research.  
The output from our tests and some descriptive statistics can be found at the end of the thesis. 
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2. Related Research  
In this chapter, we present previous findings related to our chosen area of research. The 
majority of former studies on private equity focus on the buyout segment. In a working paper 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research, Davis et al. (2011) analyze job creation and 
destruction in American companies with late stage ownership changes. By using propensity 
score matching, they are able to identify similar companies in terms of age, size, former growth 
and number of establishments. When comparing target companies with matched controls, they 
find evidence of a drop in employment after acquisition. The drop is, however, largely 
dependent on which industry the target firms operate in.  
In a discussion paper issued by the Centre of European Economic Research, Engel (2002) 
analyzes the effect of VCs’ and other investors’ involvement in young, innovative and fast 
growing firms in Germany. He finds that surviving VC backed firms achieve significantly 
higher employment growth rates, because of the financial involvement and the services 
provided by the VCs. Further, Engel finds that VCs are better suited to push the portfolio 
companies to a faster and higher growth during the time of the venture, relative to other 
investors.   
Belke, Fehn and Foster (2003) analyze VC backed companies in 20 OECD countries, and 
provide empirical evidence of a causal relationship between VC funding and employment 
growth at the macro level. The authors argue that job creation might also depend on markets 
that are complementary to the labor market, and thus, they include capital market variables in 
their analyses. They find that VC funding significantly raises employment growth and job 
creation. However, they state that VC funding mainly contributes to job creation in new and 
innovative companies.  
Alemany and Martí (2005) analyze a sample of over 300 Spanish VC backed firms from 1989 
to 1998 to study the economic impact of VC funding, where growth in employment is one of 
their variables of interest. They look at the effect over time, and compare the results to a control 
group of similar non-VC backed firms. They analyze average annual growth from the year of 
investment and three years ahead, and find evidence to support that several variables, including 
employment, grow faster in VC backed firms.  
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Croce, Martí and Murtinu (2013) study the performance of European VC backed firms1 in 
high-tech industries, and compare them to a matched control group. They analyze the 
productivity growth before and after the first round of VC investment, using different 
measures for productivity. They find that total factor productivity and capital productivity 
growth are significantly higher in VC backed firms during the holding period. However, they 
find no significant differences in labor productivity growth between the two groups.  
Relatively few research papers focus on how VC investments affect employment and 
productivity in Norwegian portfolio firms. In a publication from Menon Business Economics, 
Grünfeld and Grimsby (2008) study the economic impact of VC and private equity 
investments in Norway. They analyze how employment develops in private equity and VC 
backed firms, and look at how the investments contribute to society in terms of tax payments 
and regional job creation. They find that this type of ownership strongly promotes employment 
growth, and find no reason to claim that the economy suffers due to the presence of VC and 
private equity ownership. Rather, the portfolio companies contribute with higher tax payments 
and wage bills.  
 
                                                 
1 The countries included in the research are Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
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3. Introduction to Private Equity and Venture 
Capital 
The British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (BVCA, 2015) defines private 
equity (PE) as “finance provided in return for an equity stake in potentially high growth 
companies”. PE firms are median to long-term investors, and the investment horizon is 
typically five to seven years (BVCA, 2015). The ultimate goal for the investor is to realize 
returns by exiting the business in better shape than when it was acquired (BVCA, 2015).  The 
most common exit routes are trade sale to an industrial buyer, secondary sale to another PE 
fund, listing through initial public offering and sale to the management group (CapMan, 2012). 
To obtain best possible returns, PE firms often specialize in certain industries and/or stages of 
the portfolio companies’ life cycle.   
3.1 Different Types of Private Equity 
One can divide PE into different segments, where the main distinction is between VC and 
buyout investments. These segments relate to the life cycle stage of the portfolio company.   
According to Argentum (2015), VC is a subset of PE and refers to equity investments made 
to fund an early stage, i.e. seed and start-up, or expansion venture. In this context, investments 
in seed companies involve financing provided to research, assess and develop an initial 
concept. Further, the start-up stage refers to financing provided to companies for development 
of products and initial marketing. Investments in companies within the expansion stage 
involve providing capital for the growth and expansion of a company. In this thesis, we will 
refer to investments in seed, start-up and expansion stages as VC investments. 
The buyout segment typically relates to investments in larger and more mature portfolio 
companies. Argentum defines a buyout transaction as an acquisition of a business, business 
unit or company from the current shareholders (Argentum, 2015). As this thesis focuses on 
VC investments, we will not describe the buyout segment in more detail.  
 12
4. Theory 
In this chapter, we present theory that can explain why VC backed companies may perform 
better than their competitors.  
4.1 The Role of Ownership 
The following theory is based on the book Hvem eier Norge? [Who owns Norway?], written 
by Grünfeld and Jakobsen (2006).  
Grünfeld and Jakobsen have developed a framework for how owners can add value to their 
company. They highlight the following four roles of the owner:  
1. Selection 
2. Fuel 
3. Complementary resources 
4. Guidance 
By filling these four roles, the owners will contribute with competent capital to the company. 
We will now describe the roles in more detail, with focus on what is relevant for VC 
ownership. 
4.1.1 Selection  
The role of selection is about identifying the investment objects that will yield the highest 
possible returns for the owners. Selecting companies and investment objects requires financial 
expertise, as well as the ability to evaluate technology, the organization, consumer behavior 
and competitiveness. One also need to keep in mind that the ability to add value differs among 
investors, and that the investors often have different risk preferences and time perspectives. 
Thus, the selection process is not a zero-sum game, but rather a value-adding role. 
4.1.2 Fuel  
Grünfeld and Jakobsen refer to capital as fuel. Capital injections can work as an accelerator, 
and draining capital can be seen as a brake for the company. The injections are relevant for all 
stages that require investments. However, Grünfeld and Jakobsen state that the demand for 
capital is highest in early stages.  
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In private equity, the initial capital injection is usually followed by several larger follow up 
investments. This is because the demand for capital often arises at different points in time, and 
it is easier to maintain control if the owner conducts sequential injections in the portfolio 
company.  
VCs contribute with “fuel” to innovative companies. Besides funding already existing ideas, 
the chances of receiving funding also work as an incentive for potential future entrepreneurs. 
Hence, these investors also contribute to promote future innovation. 
4.1.3 Complementary Resources  
For a company to operate efficiently in a market, it is dependent on several factors. For 
example, it is important to create a relationship with suppliers and customers, as well as to 
attract people with relevant expertise. While the entrepreneurs often have good knowledge of 
the product, they usually do not possess other skills required to succeed commercially. PE 
funds, however, specialize in providing the right resources in certain stages in a company’s 
life cycle. Hence, they can build a pool of resources tailor-made for the relevant stage. Through 
active ownership, the portfolio company can access complementary resources that are 
essential for future value creation.  
4.1.4 Guidance  
According to Grünfeld and Jakobsen, guidance can be described as a continuous four-step 
process, as illustrated by Figure 4-1. The first step is about defining the mission and goals of 
the company. The second step involves creating a strategy to make sure that the defined goals 
will be reached. After designing the strategy, the third step is to implement it the right way. 
Even though step two and three both are tasks mainly performed by the management, the 
owners should nevertheless engage in these activities to make sure the company reaches the 
defined goals. The latter represents the fourth step in the process, which is known as control 
and monitoring.  
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Figure 4-1: The four steps of guidance  
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5. Dataset and Possible Biases 
We will now present the data used in our analysis. We start by introducing the sources of our 
data. Further, we describe the process of identifying VC backed companies and their 
comparable companies. In the last section, we look at possible biases that may affect the 
results.  
5.1 Sources of Data 
Our main source of data is the accounting database from the Centre for Applied Research at 
NHH (SNF). This database contains accounting data and company information for all 
Norwegian companies from 1992 to 2013. It underwent comprehensive revision in 2013, 
where one of the latest updates was a supplementation of number of employees from NAV 
back to 1995 (Berner, Mjøs and Olving, 2014).  
To retrieve information about VC transactions, we were granted access to the database of 
Argentum Centre for Private Equity (ACPE) at NHH. By using this database, we gained 
information about Norwegian portfolio companies, including name of fund and fund manager, 
date of entry and investment stage.  
5.2 Identification of VC Backed Companies 
As described above, we use information from the ACPE database to identify VC backed 
companies. The scope of our thesis is limited to Norwegian portfolio companies that have 
received investments from Norwegian VC funds. We exclude portfolio companies backed by 
foreign funds, due to relatively few observations and some missing values. In addition, foreign 
ownership may affect portfolio companies in a slightly different way, which is not something 
we look into. Further, we exclude portfolio companies registered as buyout transactions, as 
we only focus on early stages in this thesis. In the database, the main classifications are seed, 
venture and buyout, and our sample includes portfolio companies registered as seed and 
venture. As described in section 3.1, we use the collective terms VC investments and VC 
backed firms.   
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To obtain a large sample of VC backed companies, we study portfolio companies that have 
received first round of VC investment between 1995 and 2012. As Graph 5-1 illustrates, the 
majority of VC entries in our sample occur after 2003. However, we believe that including 
more years (and thus more observations) will improve our analysis. A long time span covers 
both booms and recessions in the economy, and any significant results may therefore be 
generalized to apply for other time periods and different economic conditions.  
 
Even though we have information about VC investments from Argentum’s database prior to 
1995, we are dependent on having information about employment from the SNF database. 
Employment information is limited before 1995, which is why we exclude any VC 
investments prior to this year. We also remove portfolio companies with first round of VC 
investment after 2012, as we do not have accounting data after 2013.  
Further, we exclude portfolio companies with missing fund entry dates. This is because we 
want to analyze a potential VC effect in the years following the first round of investment. If 
one or more fund entry dates are missing, it is difficult to identify which investment is the first, 
and we therefore choose to remove these companies from our sample.  
5.3 Identification of Comparable Companies 
In order to analyze the VC effect on employment and productivity in Norwegian portfolio 
companies, we need to compare the VC backed companies (target group) to similar and 
comparable non-VC backed companies (control group). We use propensity score matching to 
Graph 5-1: The distribution of VC entries in our timespan 
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find comparable firms, based on some observable characteristics pre-VC entry. More 
specifically, we match each target firm with a control firm, based on characteristics one year 
before the target received first round of VC investment. We choose one year before as a 
reference year, because we want the two groups to be as similar as possible ex ante, and we 
want to make sure that any potential VC effects had not yet affected the portfolio companies. 
We describe propensity score matching in more detail in section 6.1. 
To find control companies for our VC backed companies, we have to decide which 
characteristics our matching should be based on. According to previous research on similar 
topics (see for example Davis et al., 2011), industry, firm size and firm age are characteristics 
that have impact on a firm’s growth, and should therefore be included in the matching. We 
also add geographical region as a matching criterion, as there might be differences between 
the different regions in Norway. In summary, our matching is based on the following: 
 Same calendar year (the year before VC entry) 
 Same industry, based on the five-digit NACE code 
 Similar size, measured in number of employees 
 Similar age, based on year of incorporation 
 Similar region  
 
The first two are set as strict requirements, forcing exact matching on industry and calendar 
year. The remaining three characteristics may deviate if no exact match is found. However, 
due to our large pool of potential control companies, most matched controls are very similar 
to their respective target at the time of matching. To the best of our knowledge, none of the 
companies in the control group have received any type of PE investment.  
We also considered adding previous growth in employment (i.e. before VC entry) as a 
matching criterion. However, as many of our target firms only have been active for one year 
before VC entry, we were not able to create such a measure for all firms. Another issue is that 
percentage growth can vary a lot for small and midsize companies. For example, an increase 
from two to four employees represents a 100 percent increase. Matching on previous growth 
could easily lead to an exclusion of a potential control firm that increases its number of 
employees from three to four, even though the two firms could be a good match. Hence, we 
choose not to use previous growth as a matching criterion. 
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5.4 Constructed Variables 
We will now give a brief description of the variables we have constructed in our dataset. The 
term “treatment” refers to VC funding, while “target firms” and “targets” refer to firms that 
have received or will receive VC funding.  
Employment 
Variable equal to the logarithm of number of employees+1 on firm level. We use the logarithm 
to adjust for skewness towards large values. We use employees+1 in order to avoid 
mathematical error in the cases where the number of employees is equal to zero. 
Employment growth 
Variable equal to annual changes in the logarithm of employees+1 on firm level, calculated as 
log(employeest +1)– log(employees t-1+1). 
Industry employment growth 
Variable equal to annual changes in the logarithm of employees+1 on industry level, calculated 
as log(employeest+1)-log(employeest-1+1) for each five-digit industry code.  
Productivity 
Variable equal to the logarithm of sales revenues divided by payroll expenses on firm level. 
We use the logarithm to adjust for skewness towards large values. Sales revenue is in the 
numerator, as this represents the core activity of the company. We prefer sales rather than 
reported net income, as net income in startups often is sensitive to depreciation expenses. We 
prefer payroll expenses rather than number of employees in the denominator, because we want 
the productivity measure to reflect sales revenues per amount invested in the labor force.  
Productivity growth 
Variable equal to annual changes in the logarithm of sales revenues divided by payroll 
expenses on firm level, calculated as log(sales revenuest/payroll expensest) - log(sales 
revenuest-1 /payroll expensest-1). 
Treatment 
Dummy variable equal to one for all VC backed firms and zero for all control firms. This 
variable does not take into account when the target firms receive VC funding, but is equal to 
one in all years for these firms.  
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After 
Dummy variable equal to one in the year of VC entry and onwards for each VC backed firm 
and their matched control. As a result, we can distinguish between “before” and “after” VC 
entry for both targets and their matched controls.  
Treatment*After 
Interaction variable equal to one in the year of VC entry and onwards for VC backed firms. 
VC entry time dummies (t+X) 
Dummy variables equal to one in different years following VC entry. For example, t+1 is 
equal to one if the observation is one year after VC entry. This applies both for targets and for 
their matched controls.  
Treatment*VC entry time dummies 
Interaction variables equal to 1 in different years following VC entry for VC backed firms.  
VC activity 
Variable that measures the degree of VC activity, measured as number of active VC backed 
companies in a given industry for a given year. 
VC activity dummy  
Dummy variable equal to one if there are one or more VC backed companies present in the 
industry the given year, zero otherwise. 
5.5 Possible Biases 
We will now present the biases we believe are most relevant for our research. In the first two 
subsections, we present biases related to our sample of data, namely selection bias and 
survivorship bias. Lastly, we will present a potential bias related to our matching procedure, 
and discuss whether incomplete matching can influence the results. 
5.5.1 Selection Bias 
Selection bias is an error introduced when the study population does not represent the 
population intended to be analyzed (Delgado-Rodríguez and Llorca, 2004). In our case, the 
selection of portfolio companies can lead to such a bias. For an investment to take place, the 
VCs will screen potential candidates, and aim to invest in the firm with the greatest probability 
 20
of high returns. This means that our target firms may already have large potential for growth, 
since the VCs have chosen them. If this is the case, one should expect that VC backed firms 
grow more than comparable firms due to the nature of these firms, and not due to the VC entry.  
At the same time, the owners of the firms must be willing to accept the terms from the VCs. 
It can be plausible to assume that any firm with high growth ambitions would want a VC 
investor as an owner, because the investor will contribute with experience and other resources 
that the firm needs in order to reach its goals. Then again, one can also assume that some of 
the best firms do not consider VC funding, because they do not want to lose control and 
ownership. If they have great probability for success, it should be possible to get access to 
capital elsewhere. If this is the case, one should not expect VC backed firms to grow faster 
than other firms. In fact, some of our control firms may have considered VC funding or VCs 
may have considered investing in some of our control firms. However, we do not have any 
information about this.  
VC funding is a result of mutual acceptance, which is something one has to keep in mind when 
reading this thesis. Optimally, we would want to eliminate any biases related to the selection 
process, in order to isolate the effect of VC ownership. For example, we could use potential 
for growth as one of the matching criteria as an attempt to improve the matching procedure. 
However, potential is very difficult to measure, as it depends on several different factors. We 
therefore settle with the matching procedure described in section 5.3.  
5.5.2 Survivorship Bias 
Survivorship bias is another bias that can influence our results. It arises when failed companies 
are excluded from the analysis. As a result, only the successful companies remain in the 
analysis, and this causes the results to skew higher than it should (Moen and Riis, 2001). In 
our dataset, both target and control firms disappear for different reasons. The main reason is 
that many companies received VC funding only a few years ago. For example, several targets 
received VC funding between 2010 and 2012, which, given our timespan, shortens the 
reported post-VC period down to only a few years. Further, we also know that bankruptcy 
causes some firms to drop out. Other explanations can be mergers and acquisitions, or 
dissolution of the firm.  
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Due to the reasons mentioned above, the number of active firms decreases with the number of 
years after VC entry. However, this applies for both target and control firms. By looking at 
Graph 5-2, we see that there are no major differences between targets and controls regarding 
how many companies that fall out in the years after VC entry. Given that the main reason for 
a declining number of observations is recently VC backed firms, we will argue that 
survivorship bias is not a major concern for our further analysis.  
 
5.5.3 Bias Due to Incomplete Matching 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) show that the bias due to incomplete matching can be severe. 
They introduce the median absolute standardized bias as a measure of differences between 
treatment and control group before matching.  The standardized difference between the means 
for a given covariate (xi) can be written as
2: 
 
𝐵(𝑋𝑖) = 100 ∗  
?̅?𝑖1 −  ?̅?𝑖0
√1
2 (𝑉1
(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑉0(𝑥𝑖)) 
 
                                                 
2 The formula is formalized by Becker and Hvide (2015), based on the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
Graph 5-2: Number of active targets and control firms the years after VC entry 
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?̅?i1 is the unit mean for the treated observations, and ?̅?i0 is the corresponding unit mean for 
controls. V1(xi) and V0(xi) denote the sample variances in the treated and the control group, 
respectively. 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), a value of 20 is “large”, meaning that there are 
substantial differences between the target group and control group ex ante. For our matched 
sample, the median absolute standardized bias is 8.2. Even though this number is significantly 
lower than 20, it indicates that the matching has not managed to remove all the differences in 
pre-treatment characteristics between targets and controls. This should be kept in mind while 
interpreting the results in the analysis. 
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6. Methodology 
In this chapter, we will present the methodology used in our analysis. We start by describing 
the propensity score matching in more detail. Further, we describe the regressions we conduct 
in the analysis. This includes a description of the difference-in-differences estimator and the 
corresponding regression model setup.  
6.1 Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity score matching is a matching technique used on observational data. In many 
studies, there are often small groups of subjects exposed to treatment, relative to the untreated 
control subjects. Matched sampling attempts to choose the controls that are most similar to the 
treated subjects with respect to measured background variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985). These specified background variables are known as covariates, and are assumed to 
affect the probability of being treated. By controlling for these covariates, the propensity score 
matching attempts to reduce potential biases due to confounding variables. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) show that matching based on propensity scores, when successful, tend to balance 
the observed covariates.  
The estimated probability of being treated, i.e. the propensity score, can be expressed as 
𝑃(𝑋) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑑 = 1)| 𝑋 
where d = 1 indicates a treated observation, and X denotes the observable characteristics used 
in the matching (Herzog, 2008). In accordance with the methodology, propensity scores are 
derived for all entities. Based on the size of the propensity scores, targets are matched with 
controls. This means that the target’s match is the control firm with the most similar propensity 
score. 
6.2 Regression Analyses 
In general, regression analysis is a way of estimating the relationship between variables. When 
performing regressions on longitudinal data, we are also interested in capturing changes over 
time. The majority of the regressions in this thesis are difference-in-differences analyses. We 
will now describe this type of regression model in more detail.  
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6.2.1 Difference-in-Differences Regression 
The difference-in-differences regression is a tool used to estimate the effect of a treatment, see 
for example Card and Krueger (1994). By comparing the differences in outcome pre- and post-
treatment for a treated and a control group, one can derive the difference-in-differences 
estimator (Waldinger, 2014). The estimator is defined as: 
 
 
?̅?denotes the outcome variable for treated and controls, and β1 is the difference-in-differences 
estimator. Graph 6-1 illustrates this relationship.  
 
 
Model Setup 
Instead of performing regression analyses using the whole sample of data, we only include the 
target firms and their matched controls. The main reason for doing so is that the ‘after’-period 
for non-VC backed firms cannot be defined unless they are picked as a match for a target firm. 
Because we restrict the matching within the same calendar year, we can define ‘before’ and 
‘after’ VC entry both for target firms and control firms. Another reason is that targets and 
potential controls are not necessarily similar before VC entry. The matching will therefore 
allow us to compare target firms with their best matches – based on observable pre-treatment 
characteristics – instead of also including non-VC backed companies that are not similar at all. 
𝛽1
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓−𝑖𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠 =  ( ?̅?  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 −  ?̅?  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒) −  (?̅? 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙, 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 −  ?̅?  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙, 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒) 
Graph 6-1: The difference-in-differences estimator 
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For these reasons, we use the matched sample in the difference-in-differences analyses, 
including 134 targets and 134 controls.  
We run difference-in-differences panel regressions to analyze differences between target firms 
and matched control firms before and after VC entry. The regressions are of the following 
type3: 
 
 
 
As defined in section 5.4, Treatment is a dummy variable and is equal to one for all targets. 
After is also a dummy variable and it changes from zero to one in the year of VC entry, both 
for targets and their matched control firms. This means that if a target receives its first VC 
investment in 2005, After will be equal to zero from the year of incorporation to 2004, and 
equal to one from 2005 and onwards. The same applies for its matched control firm. X 
represents firm characteristics (industry, region and firm size), and δ represents year dummies.  
Our focus is on the coefficient of the constructed interaction variable (β2), as it captures the 
difference-in-differences between targets and control firms after VC entry. If it is significantly 
different from zero, VC funding has an effect on the dependent variable. In addition, β1 will 
also be of interest, because it indicates whether there are fundamental differences in the 
outcome variable between the target and control group. Optimally, this coefficient should not 
be significantly different from zero, as we want the target and control group to be as similar 
as possible ex ante. 
Further, we will expand the regression analysis by dividing the ‘after’-period into several post-
treatment periods. By generating specified interaction variables for each year after VC entry, 
we are able to separate any short-term and/or long-term effects of VC entry on the outcome 
variable.  We are interested in the coefficients for these different interaction variables, as they 
will measure the difference-in-differences between target firms and control firms one year, 
two years, three years etc. after VC entry.  
                                                 
3In the analysis, Performance indicator represents either level of employment, employment growth, level of productivity or 
productivity growth. We use a similar model specification as Becker and Hvide (2015). 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑖𝑡
 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖+ 𝛽 2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽 3 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡 +
  𝛾 ∗ 𝑋 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀  
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7. Analysis 
We start by providing the reader with an introduction to the analysis, where we scratch the 
surface of the data. Then we present the results from the analyses, in order to answer our three 
research questions. To answer the first question, we test whether there are significant 
differences in employment between targets and matched controls before and after VC entry. 
In order to answer the second research question, we test whether the degree of VC activity 
affects employment in other, non-VC backed companies. We will then answer the third 
research question by testing whether VC entry affects the productivity in portfolio firms.  
7.1 Introduction  
In this section, we will describe and illustrate the main features of our data. Throughout the 
analysis, we define the year of treatment as “t”, and thus t+X represents X years after 
treatment. “t-1” refers to the year before treatment, i.e. the year of matching.  
We start by plotting the average number of employees in target and control firms the years 
before and after VC entry, illustrated in Graph 7-1. The aim is to check whether we can identify 
any clear differences just by looking at the development in employment. The Y-axis displays 
average number of employees, and the X-axis displays the timespan.  
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Graph 7-1: Average number of employees for targets and controls before and after VC entry 
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As the graph illustrates, the average number of employees is similar for the two groups up 
until the year before VC entry. After that point, the two groups seem to develop differently. 
Rather than continuing at the same level as controls, the targets experience a significant 
increase in employees after VC entry. With the exception of two years after VC entry, the 
employment in target firms continues to grow throughout the given timespan.  
Second, we want to take a closer look at the spread in number of employees for targets and 
controls after VC entry, to get an impression of the differences within the two groups. Thus, 
we plot the observations in both groups from the 10th to 90th percentile. Graph 7-2 and Graph 
7-3 show the spread for targets and controls, respectively. The Y-axis is an index, where the 
number of employees in the year before VC entry (t-1) is set to one. The X-axis denotes the 
timeline. As the graphs illustrate, the differences within the target group are large compared 
to the differences within the control group. Three years after VC entry, 90 percent of the targets 
are situated between zero and six on the index, where six indicates a six-fold increase in 
employees.  In comparison, the corresponding interval for controls are between zero and two 
on the index. In the next section, we want to dig deeper into the differences identified in this 
section, and hopefully be able to quantify the VC effect on employment.  
 
For more information about our dataset, please see the descriptive statistics at the end of the 
thesis. 
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7.2 Research Question I: How Do VC Investments Affect 
Employment in Portfolio Firms? 
From what we saw in section 7.1, targets seem to experience employment growth after VC 
entry relative to the matched control firms. In this part of the analysis, we will try to quantify 
the effect of VC investment on employment in target firms by performing difference-in-
differences analyses. To make sure that we compare the targets with companies that are similar 
ex ante, we use our matched controls as basis for comparison. We control for firm fixed and 
year fixed effects, as well as firm size4.  
Our focus is on how VC investments affect the level of employment and annual employment 
growth. The analysis of level effects is of interest because it provides information about how 
VC investments can contribute to net job creation in target firms, and whether the effect 
sustains. When analyzing level effects, we run regressions of the following type: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖+ 𝛽 2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽 3 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡                
+   𝛾 ∗ 𝑋 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀 
By analyzing annual employment changes, we can identify how employment in target firms 
changes from one year to another relative to control firms. When analyzing annual growth 
effects, we run regressions of the following type: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖+ 𝛽 2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽 3 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡                
+   𝛾 ∗ 𝑋 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
7.2.1 Employment: Level Effects 
We start by running a regression where we look at the overall differences in the level of 
employment before and after VC entry for targets and controls. Table 7-1 presents the 
regression results5. We see that After*Treatment is significant on a one percent level, and we 
can therefore reject the null hypothesis which states that VC entry does not have a significant 
impact on the level of employment in target firms. In other words, we can conclude that after 
receiving their first round of VC investment, targets experience a significant increase in 
                                                 
4 Firm fixed effects include region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per December 31 the year before. 
5 The interpretation of the results is based on the first column in the table, marked as (1). 
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number of employees. The size of the effect is large – the mean effect of VC entry on 
employment is 64 percent6. The table also presents other regression specifications, where we 
change the control variables as a robustness check. The results are, however, relatively similar. 
We are also interested in the coefficient of the Treatment-dummy, as this provides for a test 
of (a lack of) pre-treatment effects. The result shows that it is not statistically significant, which 
suggests that there are no overall pre-treatment effects in the level of employment.  
In sum, the results indicate that there is a positive overall effect of VC funding on the level of 
employment in target firms.  
Next, we expand the regression and replace the After-dummy with several post-treatment 
period dummies as described in section 6.2.1. As a consequence, the interaction variable 
Treatment*After is replaced by interaction variables for each post-treatment period7. Table 7-
2 presents the regression results. 
First, we find that the VC effect on employment levels in the year of entry is 46 percent and 
significant at a one percent level. This indicates that VC entry has a large impact on the level 
of employment in VC backed firms already in the year of entry. One reason can be that the 
VCs quickly restructure the target firms to accelerate growth, by e.g. bringing in relevant 
expertise required to succeed. Further, there are also positive differences in the years following 
the VC entry. After three years, the VC effect is 66 percent, indicating that the differences 
between targets and controls continue to increase in the years following the investment.  
Further, we can see from Table 7-2 that the positive effect on the employment level is present 
in a longer run as well. It is, however, important to keep in mind that this regression is based 
on the number of employees each year, rather than employment changes from one year to 
another. This means that an increase in the level of employment for a given year will be present 
in subsequent years as well, unless there is a reversal effect.  
                                                 
6 With log dependent variables, we use exp(coefficient)-1 to find the percentage effect of the variable: exp(0.4975)-1= 0.6446. 
This approach applies for all the analyses of level effects in this thesis. 
7 As we are most interested in the VC effect on employment in the first years following VC entry, we have one interaction 
variable for each year up until three years after VC entry. We also have one interaction variable representing all the following 
years, i.e. “the longer run”.  
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In sum, we have found that VC investments lead to net job creation in target firms, and we 
find no evidence indicating a reversal effect within our timespan.   
7.2.2 Employment: Growth Effects 
We will now perform the same types of regressions as in the previous section, but we use 
annual employment change rather than the level of employment as dependent variable. We 
start by conducting the basic before/after regression, in order to study the overall effect of VC 
funding on employment growth. Table 7-3 presents the regression results, and we see that the 
results are different from the corresponding level-analysis. The interaction variable 
Treatment*After is no longer significant, and we cannot conclude that VC investments have 
an overall effect on annual employment growth.  
By now, we know that the level of employment increases after VC entry, but we have not 
managed to identify any overall effects of VC funding on employment change. However, this 
does not mean that there are no differences between the two groups in some of the years 
following VC entry. Therefore, we will examine the after-period in more detail. We expand 
the regression analysis in the same way as we expanded the analysis of level effects. Table 7-
4 presents the regression results.  
Our results suggest that VC funding increases employment growth by 12 percentage points in 
the year of investment8. The coefficient is significant at a 10 percent level. Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find no results indicating that VC investment leads to significant differences 
in annual employment growth beyond the year of VC entry. This indicates that the annual 
employment growth in target firms develops similarly as for the control firms after the 
investment year.   
Note that the Treatment-dummy is statistically significant in both the simple and the expanded 
regression analysis. The results indicate that target firms in general grow by ten percentage 
points more than the control group, independently of VC entry. Optimally, we would want 
there to be no such pre-treatment differences between the two groups. However, as we chose 
not to include previous employment growth as a matching criterion, we knew this was a 
                                                 
8 When the dependent variable is the first difference in logarithms, we use exp(coefficient)-1 to find the effect of the variable. 
Multiplied by 100, the effect can be interpreted as percentage points. This approach applies for all growth analyses in the 
thesis. 
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possible outcome. Note that the general differences should not affect the additional growth 
that arises due to VC entry, which means that our findings still provide interesting indications 
of how VC funding affects employment growth. 
In sum, our results suggest that VC funding affects the employment growth rate in the year of 
VC entry. Beyond this point, there are no clear differences in growth caused by VC funding. 
Based on this result, it would be interesting to know whether the differences arise gradually in 
the year of investment, or if it occurs immediately. This is something we take a closer look at 
in the following subsection.  
Employment Growth in the Year of VC Entry 
We will now analyze the effect on employment growth in the year of VC entry. As the 
employment data is based on year-end reporting, we want to see whether the time with VC 
funding has a significant impact on the employment growth within the year of investment. If 
the effect is immediate, it should not matter whether target firms receive VC funding in 
January or December. Then again, if it takes some time before VC entry affects target firms, 
one should expect VC funding in January to have stronger impact on employment growth than 
VC funding in December. 
To examine these scenarios, we run a separate regression analysis on the target firms, where 
we only include the observations in the year of investment. As a measure of time with VC 
funding, we use number of weeks with VC funding in the entry year. As before, we control 
for year fixed effects, firm fixed effects and firm size. Table 7-5 presents the results from the 
regression.  
As the table reveals, number of weeks with VC funding has no significant impact on 
employment growth in the year of VC entry. We also try similar regressions, using months 
and then a dummy9, rather than weeks with funding. However, the results are more or less the 
same. Based on these results, we find no evidence to support that the VC effect arises gradually 
in the investment year. This indicates that the identified employment growth occurs shortly 
after the time of entry.  
                                                 
9 The dummy was equal to one if VC funding was between January and June in the entry year, zero otherwise.  
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7.3 Research Question II: Does the Presence of VC 
Backed Firms Affect Employment in Competing Firms? 
By now, we have seen that VC funding has a positive impact on employment in Norwegian 
portfolio firms. In this part of the thesis, we analyze whether VC investments also affect the 
employment growth in other, non-VC backed companies. When VC backed firms grow, do 
they grow at the expense of others firms within their industry? If VC investments have a 
substantial negative effect on employment growth in competing firms, it suggests that VC 
investments lead to a reallocation of labor rather than contributing to net job creation.  
To analyze how VC investments affect the employment growth in other firms, we construct a 
new dataset with annual employment data for each industry10. Rather than basing the analysis 
on our matched sample, we now include all Norwegian firms11. Our main indicator of VC 
presence is the constructed variable VC activity, i.e. the number of active target firms that have 
received VC funding in a given industry for a given year. Further, we also run regressions 
using a simple dummy for whether or not there are VC funded companies present in the 
industry. We run panel regressions of the following type: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐶 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀 
where i denotes the industry, t denotes the year, and Xit are control variables. 
7.3.1 Results 
We start by running regressions using VC activity as the explanatory variable, and Table 7-6 
presents the results. As before, we run several regressions with different model specifications. 
As a start, we control for average firm age and average total assets in the industry, as well as 
parent industry group12. The regression result indicates that there is a negative relationship 
between VC investments and employment growth in the related industry. More specifically, a 
one-unit increase in VC activity is expected to decrease the annual employment growth in the 
                                                 
10As a definition of industry, we use five-digit NACE code. 
11 The employment data includes all Norwegian firms registered in the SNF accounting database. We have excluded the 
employees in target firms as well as firms backed by other types of private equity to isolate the effect on other firms.  
12 By including parent industry group, we control for variation attributed to overall industry characteristics. For example, if 
the parent group “Oil and gas” experience a drop in employment growth, the effect will be captured by this control variable.  
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industry by approximately two percentage points. The same result applies when we use 
average sales revenues as an additional control variable.  
Next, we use the same model specifications, but control for year fixed effects as well. The 
year dummies will capture variation over time in the employment growth that is not attributed 
to the other explanatory variables. As Table 7-6 shows, this changes the results. We no longer 
find evidence of a negative relationship between VC activity and employment growth. The 
coefficient of VC activity is now significantly reduced and clearly not significant. The change 
in results indicates that there are significant year effects with respect to employment change. 
By not controlling for these variations, the previous regressions incorrectly indicate a 
relationship between VC activity and employment growth.  
Further, we change the indicator of VC activity, and use the constructed VC activity dummy 
instead of number of active VC funded companies. This means that we only distinguish 
between whether or not there are VC backed companies present in the industry, and the aim is 
to check if there is an overall effect on employment growth. Table 7-6 presents the results 
from the regression analyses. Again, we try different model specifications, switching between 
the same control variables as in the first analysis. In short, there are no large differences 
compared to our first findings.  
To sum up the results, we find no reason to claim that employment in competing firms suffers 
due to the presence of VC backed firms. This indicates that VC investments contribute to net 
job creation. 
7.4 Research Question III: How Do VC Investments Affect 
Productivity in Portfolio Firms? 
From section 7.2, we know that VC funding has a positive impact on the employment level in 
VC backed firms. However, we are also interested in the productivity of this workforce. Does 
VC funding also influence the productivity in target firms? Rather than analyzing sales per 
worker, we define productivity as sales revenues divided by payroll expenses. We prefer this 
measure, as it reflects the value created in the firm per NOK spent on employment.  
Similar to the analyses of employment, we run difference-in-differences regressions to study 
the VC effect on productivity levels, as well as the effect on annual productivity growth. When 
analyzing level effects, we run regressions of the following type: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽 1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖+ 𝛽 2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽 3 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡                
+   𝛾 ∗ 𝑋 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀 
In the analysis of growth effects, we change the dependent variable: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖+ 𝛽 2 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽 3 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡                
+   𝛾 ∗ 𝑋 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀 
Similar to section 7.2, we perform regression analyses with the simple After-dummy, in 
addition to the extended regressions where we divide the dummy into different year variables. 
The VC effect on productivity may depend on several different factors. From section 4.1.3, 
we know that VCs often bring in expertise in the holding period to increase the profitability. 
This may translate into higher wage levels in target firms, which again will lead to higher 
payroll expenses. The impact on productivity will depend on whether they manage to increase 
sales revenues proportionally. 
7.4.1 Productivity: Level Effects  
Table 7-7 presents the results from the first regression analysis, where we analyze overall 
differences in the level of productivity between the two groups. Treatment*After is still our 
main variable of interest, as this variable captures the difference-in-differences estimator. 
Interestingly, we find evidence of a negative relationship between VC funding and 
productivity. The results suggest that VC funding leads to an overall decrease in the 
productivity level by 37 percent13, and the coefficient is significant at a one percent level. It is 
also worth noting that the Treatment-dummy is not statistically significant, which indicates no 
pre-treatment differences in productivity levels between the two groups. 
As for the extended version in Table 7-8, we see that the interaction variables are statistically 
significant all years after VC entry. The differences arise already in the year of investment, 
where VC entry decreases the productivity level by 45 percent. After three years, the negative 
effect is 37 percent. Even though the differences between the two groups are somewhat lower 
in a longer run, the negative impact of VC entry seems to be consistent.  
                                                 
13 As before, we use exp(coefficient)-1 to find the percentage effect. The interpretation of the results is based on the first 
column in the table, marked as (1). 
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One explanation for why target firms have lower productivity after VC entry could be that it 
takes time before the new employees reach the productivity level of more experienced 
employees. As we have identified higher levels of employment in targets starting from the 
year of VC entry, the lower productivity may indicate that target firms are not able to increase 
sales proportionally to payroll expenses in the beginning. However, it does not explain why 
the negative effect is consistent several years after VC entry. This can be explained by higher 
wages in target firms relative to controls. In general, the wage structure often reflect a firm’s 
ability to attract skilled and productive employees. Interestingly, the average wage per worker 
is generally higher in target firms relative to controls, as illustrated in Graph 7-4. We also see 
that the differences increase steadily after VC entry. This development indicates that target 
firms hire a greater proportion of highly skilled workers after the time of investment. However, 
it does not seem as if they manage to exploit this to their advantage in terms of increased sales 
revenues.  
  
7.4.2 Productivity: Growth Effects  
We also want to see if the identified differences are evident in a growth perspective. Rather 
than using productivity levels, we now use annual changes in productivity as the dependent 
variable. Table 7-9 presents the results from the regression with the simple After-dummy. In 
contrast to the level-analysis, the coefficient for Treatment*After is not statistically significant, 
and we can therefore not claim that VC funding has an overall effect on productivity growth 
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Graph 7-4: Average wage in target and control firms before and after VC entry. 
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in target firms. However, since we know that the productivity levels differ between the two 
groups after VC entry, we want to take a closer look at when these differences arise. We will 
therefore conduct the expanded version of the regression, as it will capture annual growth 
differences in productivity.  
As presented in Table 7-10, we find statistically significant difference-in-differences in 
productivity growth in the year of VC entry. The size of the coefficient indicates that VC 
investments lead to a decrease in productivity of 27 percentage points this year.  After the year 
of entry, however, none of the interaction variables are statistically significant. This indicates 
that the negative growth effect is only temporary, and that the development in productivity 
growth is similar to control firms beyond the year of VC entry.  
In sum, the results from the level and growth analyses suggest that the VC effect on 
productivity is negative and immediate, and brings the target firms down to a lower level of 
productivity than the control group. The main reason for the lower productivity levels is higher 
wages in target firms. Since the growth in productivity does not pick up in the years following 
VC entry, the level of productivity never recovers to the initial level. The results are robust to 
changes in control variables. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
In this final chapter, we provide a summary of our results. We also present limitations of our 
research, before we suggest some areas for further research.  
8.1 Summary 
In this thesis, we have analyzed the effect of VC investments on employment and productivity 
in a sample of 134 Norwegian portfolio companies. The aim was to test whether private VC 
funding can contribute to job creation as policy makers tend to claim, and to see if there are 
any VC effects on productivity.  
In the first part of the analysis, we perform difference-in-differences analyses, and find that 
target firms hire more workers after VC entry than the control group. The effect is persistent, 
and we find no support for a reversal effect. We also find that the employment growth in target 
firms increases significantly in the year of entry relatively to the control group. This supports 
findings from similar research papers from other countries, as well as what policy makers tend 
to claim. However, as a basis for decision-making, we believe that one should look at the total 
net effect on employment, rather than the isolated employment effect in VC backed 
companies.  
In order to see if the presence of VC funding affects non-VC backed firms, we checked 
whether the extent of VC activity influences employment in other firms within their industry. 
We find no reason to claim that employment in other firms suffers due to the presence of VC 
ownership. This suggests that VC investments lead to net job creation in the Norwegian labor 
market. 
Third, we analyzed whether VC financing has implications for the productivity in target firms. 
We performed difference-in-differences analyses to compare productivity in targets and 
controls. We found evidence of lower productivity in targets firms after VC entry, and the 
negative effect on productivity levels was evident in both a short and long run. Some of these 
differences can be explained by higher wages in target firms after VC entry, which may reflect 
that they hire a greater proportion of skilled workers. However, it does not seem like they are 
able to exploit this in terms of increased sales revenues.  
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8.2 Limitations 
We have limited our analyses to Norwegian portfolio companies funded by Norwegian VCs. 
There might be other effects caused by the VCs being of foreign origin, but this is not 
something we look into. We also limit our analyses to first round of VC investments, rather 
than analyzing possible effects of several rounds.   
There are many factors affecting employment growth, and the effect of VC ownership will 
only be one of many. Even though our findings can provide interesting indications of how VC 
entries affect employment and productivity, we will not claim that we have controlled for all 
relevant factors. Hence, more can be done to address causality.  
8.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
From section 4.1.2, we know that capital can be an accelerator for the business, and that the 
capital flows in private equity often are characterized by several larger follow-up investments. 
It would therefore be interesting to analyze the relationship between the size of the initial 
capital injection and the employment rate. It is also of interest to check how follow-up 
injections influence employment and productivity in target firms. 
Further, we think it would be interesting to do more research related to the identified 
differences in productivity. We know that there are significant differences in labor costs that 
arise after VC entry. An approach could be to analyze the VC effect on labor composition. To 
what extent does VC entry affect the proportion of skilled workers in portfolio firms?  
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Tables 
Descriptive statistics 
Table A: Target and Control Firms - Characteristics in Year of Matching 
  Target firms Control firms 
  (1) 
Average 
(2) 
St.Dev. 
(3) 
Max 
(4) 
Min 
(5) 
Average 
(6) 
St.Dev. 
(7) 
Max 
(8) 
Min 
Employees 10 15 85 0 8 15 113 0 
Assets 28766 73116 715711 25 20279 93366 1052430 0 
Productivity 3.7 12.1 130.2 0.0 5.1 13.2 122.5 -2.4 
Sales revenues 21693 105142 1200000 0 13914 30077 219293 0 
Payroll expenses 5802 9282 60276 0 4522 10350 79984 -1475 
Assets, sales revenues and payroll expenses are in NOK 1000. Productivity measured as sales 
revenues/payroll expenses. 
 
Table B: Target Firms - Region in Year of Entry 
Region Counties 
(1) 
 
Frequency 
(2) 
 
Percent 
Østviken Østfold, Oslo, Akerhus 51 38.06 
Innlandet Hedmark, Oppland 1 0.75 
Vestviken Buskerud, Vestfold, Telemark 5 3.73 
Sørlandet Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder 9 6.72 
Vestlandet 
Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og 
Fjordane, Møre og Romsdal  35 26.12 
Trønderlag Sør-Trønderlag, Nord-Trønderlag 26 19.40 
Nord-Norge Nordland, Troms, Finnmark 7 5.22 
        
Total   134 100 
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Table C: Target Firms - Parent Industry Group in Year of Entry 
Region 
(1) 
Frequency 
(2) 
Percent   
Primary industries 7 5.22   
Oil/Gas 2 1.49   
Manufacturing industries 24 17.91   
Constructions/Energy 2 1.49   
Trade 10 7.46   
Shipping 0 0   
Transport, Tourism 1 0.75   
Finance, Insurance 2 1.49   
Services/Real estate/Advisors 45 33.58   
Health, Care 0 0   
Culture, Media 0 0   
IT, Telecom 41 30.60   
        
Total 134 100   
 
Table D: Target Firms – Year of VC Entry 
Year 
(1) 
Frequency 
(2) 
Percent   
1999 1 0.75   
2000 0 0   
2001 6 4.48   
2002 3 2.24   
2003 13 9.70   
2004 8 5.97   
2005 16 11.94   
2006 9 6.72   
2007 12 8.96   
2008 12 8.96   
2009 9 6.72   
2010 17 12.69   
2011 17 12.69   
2012 11 8.21   
        
Total 134 100   
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Regression Results 
Table 7-1: Employment Level - Overall Effect of VC Entry 
  (1) 
Employment 
(2) 
Employment 
(3) 
Employment 
Treatment 0.0210 0.0097 0.0090 
  (0.1603) (0.1746) (0.1738) 
Treatment*After 0.4975 0.6889 0.6936 
  (0.1737)*** (0.1804)*** (0.1803)*** 
After -0.2660 -0.2204 -0.1668 
  (0.1577)* (0.1656) (0.1228) 
        
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed 
effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 3,103 3,410 3,410 
R squared 0.1756 0.0485 0.0427 
 
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Employment is measured as log(employees+1). Firm fixed effects include 
region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per December 
31 the year before. 
 42
Table 7-2: Employment Level - Effect of VC Entry Over Time 
  (1) 
Employment 
(2) 
Employment 
(3) 
Employment 
Treatment 0.0207 0.0097 0.0090 
  (0.1606) (0.1748) (0.1740) 
Treatment*t 0.3762 0.4567 0.4593 
  (0.1350)*** (0.1355)*** (0.1348)*** 
Treatment*(t+1) 0.4533 0.5729 0.5783 
  (0.1438)*** (0.1456)*** (0.1456)*** 
Treatment*(t+2) 0.4751 0.6404 0.6446 
  (0.1693)*** (0.1698)*** (0.1699)*** 
Treatment*(t+3) 0.5098 0.6632 0.6657 
  (0.2044)** (0.2005)*** (0.2009)*** 
Treatment*(t+4→) 0.5663 0.8406 0.8466 
  (0.2437)** (0.2538)*** (0.2536)*** 
VC entry time 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 3,103 3,410 3,410 
R squared 0,1764 0.0512 0.0456 
        
        
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Employment is measured as log(employees+1).Firm fixed effects include 
region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per December 31 
the year before. t represents the year of VC entry for target firms. VC entry time 
dummies is a collective term for t, (t+1), (t+2), (t+3) and (t+4→). 
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Table 7-3: Employment Growth - Overall Effect of VC Entry 
  
(1) 
Employment 
growth 
(2) 
Employment 
growth 
(3) 
Employment 
growth 
Treatment 0.0946 0.0965 0.0972 
  (0.0195)*** (0.0199)*** (0.0195)*** 
Treatment*After -0.0083 -0.0220 -0.0209 
  (0.0310) (0.0306) (0.0297) 
After -0.0740 -0.0649 -0.0756 
  (0.0245)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0168)*** 
        
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed 
effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 3,046 3,109 3,109 
R squared 0.0371 0.0335 0.0178 
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Employment growth is measured as log(employeest +1) - log(employees t-1 +1). Firm 
fixed effects include region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per 
December 31 the year before. 
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Table 7-4: Employment Growth - Effect of VC Entry Over Time 
  
(1) 
Employment 
growth 
(2) 
Employment 
growth 
(3) 
Employment 
growth 
Treatment 0.0948 0.0966 0.0972 
  (0.0195)*** (0.0199)*** (0.0195)*** 
Treatment*t 0.1166 0.1199 0.1174 
  (0.0675)* (0.0677)* (0.0671)* 
Treatment*(t+1) 0.0949 0.0925 0.0940 
  (0.06320) (0.0624) (0.06348) 
Treatment*(t+2) -0.0623 -0.0661 -0.0646 
  (0.0705) (0.0681) (0.0683) 
Treatment*(t+3) -0.0875 -0.0766 -0.0744 
  (0.0609) (0.0599) (0.0589) 
Treatment*(t+4→) -0.0638 -0.0890 -0.0866 
  (0.0426) (0.0414)** (0.0409)** 
VC entry time 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 3,046 3,109 3,109 
R squared 0.0450 0.0426 0.0268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Employment growth is measured as log(employeest +1) - log(employees t-1+1). Firm fixed 
effects include region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per December 31 
the year before. t represents the year of VC entry for target firms. VC entry time dummies is a 
collective term for t, (t+1), (t+2), (t+3) and (t+4→). 
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Table 7-5: Effect of VC in the Year of Entry 
  
(1) 
Employment 
growth 
(2) 
Employment 
growth 
(3) 
Employment 
growth 
Weeks with VC -0.0051     
  (0.0036)     
Months with VC   -0.0245   
    (0.0160)   
Between January and 
June     -0.0698 
      (0.1053) 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 134 134 134 
R squared 0.3275 0.3296 0.3175 
 
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Employment growth is measured as log(employeest +1) - log(employeest-1+1). 
Weeks with VC is the number of weeks with VC funding in the year of entry. Months 
with VC is the number of months with VC funding in the year of entry. Between 
January and June is a dummy equal to one if VC entry was between January and June 
in the year of entry, zero otherwise. Firm fixed effects include region and industry 
group. Firm size is measured as total assets per December 31 the year before. 
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Table 7-6: Effect of VC Activity on Other Firms 
  
(1) 
Industry 
employment 
growth 
(2) 
Industry 
employment 
growth 
(3) 
Industry 
employment 
growth 
(4) 
Industry 
employment 
growth 
(5) 
Industry 
employment 
growth 
(6) 
Industry 
employment 
growth 
VC activity -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0080 - - - 
  (0.0116)** (0.0116)** (0.0114)       
VC activity 
dummy - - - -0.0813 -0.0809 -0.0052 
        (0.0396)** (0.0396)** (0.0394) 
              
Average 
firm age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average 
assets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent 
industry 
group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average 
sales 
revenues No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects No No Yes No No Yes 
              
Observations 12,486 12,472 12,472 12,486 12,472 12,472 
R squared 0.0162 0.0167 0.0003 0.0162 0.0167 0.0003 
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Industry employment growth is measured as log(employeest +1) - log(employees t-1 +1) for each five-
digit industry code. Average assets and average sales revenues are both measured per December 31 the year 
before.  
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Table 7-7: Productivity Level - Overall Effect of VC Entry 
  (1) 
Productivity 
(2) 
Productivity 
(3) 
Productivity 
Treatment -0.1604 -0.2007 -0.1940 
  (0.1199) (0.1391) (0.1388) 
Treatment*After -0.4571 -0.4703 -0.4791 
  (0.1379)*** (0.1542)*** (0.1528)*** 
After 0.0279 0.0665 0.0416 
  (0.0893) (0.1054) (0.0901) 
        
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed 
effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 2,513 2,678 2,678 
R squared 0.1791 0.0569 0.0480 
        
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Productivity is measured as log(sales revenues/payroll expenses). Firm 
fixed effects include region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total 
assets per December 31 the year before. 
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Table 7-8: Productivity Level - Effect of VC Entry Over Time 
  (1) 
Productivity 
(2) 
Productivity 
(3) 
Productivity 
Treatment -0.1604 -0.2007 -0.1940 
  (0.1202) (0.1394) (0.1390) 
Treatment*t -0.5892 -0.5442 -0.5538 
  (0.1465)*** (0.1546)*** (0.1549)*** 
Treatment*(t+1) -0.4174 -0.4339 -0.4384 
  (0.1734)** (0.1843)** (0.1833)** 
Treatment*(t+2) -0.3814 -0.3876 -0.3992 
  (0.1594)** (0.1673)** (0.1656)** 
Treatment*(t+3) -0.4620 -0.4676 -0.4709 
  (0.2166)** (0.2217)** (0.2189)** 
Treatment*(t+4→) -0.4376 -0.4866 -0.4953 
  (0.1927)** (0.2104)** (0.2106)** 
VC entry time 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 2,513 2,678 2,678 
R squared 0.1805 0.0607 0.0511 
 
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Productivity is measured as log(sales revenues/payroll expenses). Firm fixed 
effects include region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per 
December 31 the year before.t represents the year of VC entry for target firms. VC 
entry time dummies is a collective term for t, (t+1), (t+2), (t+3) and (t+4→). 
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Table 7-9: Productivity Growth - Overall Effect of VC 
Entry 
  
(1) 
Productivity 
growth 
(2) 
Productivity 
growth 
(3) 
Productivity 
growth 
Treatment 0.0608 0.0489 0.0490 
  (0.0441) (0.0412) (0.0413) 
Treatment*After -0.0378 -0.0361 -0.0366 
  (0.0618) (0.0605) (0.0608) 
After 0.0352 0.0316 0.0421 
  (0.0442) (0.0431) (0.0228) 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 2,336 2,363 2,363 
R squared 0.0140 0.0095 0.0006 
 
 
 
 
  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Productivity growth is measured as log(sales revenuest /payroll 
expensest) - log(sales revenuest-1 /payroll expensest-1). Firm fixed effects 
include region and industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per 
December 31 the year before. 
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Table 7-10: Productivity Growth - Effect of VC Entry Over 
Time 
  
(1) 
Productivity 
growth 
(2) 
Productivity 
growth 
(3) 
Productivity 
growth 
Treatment 0.0606 0.0488 0.0491 
  (0.0442) (0.0413) (0.0414) 
Treatment*t -0.3206 -0.3151 -0.3174 
  (0.1461)** (0.1443)** (0.1447)** 
Treatment*(t+1) 0.1344 0.1243 0.1291 
  (0.1085) (0.1103) (0.1110) 
Treatment*(t+2) -0.0751 -0.0691 -0.0732 
  (0.1420) (0.1381) (0.1385) 
Treatment*(t+3) 0.0661 0.0520 0.0489 
  (0.1764) (0.1722) (0.1726) 
Treatment*(t+4→) -0.0093 -0.0073 -0.0071 
  (0.0685) (0.0643) (0.0639) 
VC entry time 
dummies Yes Yes Yes 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No No 
Firm size Yes No No 
        
Observations 2,336 2,363 2,363 
R squared 0.0195 0.0147 0.0055 
 Standard errors in parenthesis: *significance at ten, ** five, *** one percent. 
Note: Productivity is measured as log(sales revenuest /payroll expensest) - 
log(sales revenuest-1 /payroll expensest-1). Firm fixed effects include region and 
industry group. Firm size is measured as total assets per December 31 the year 
before. t represents the year of VC entry for target firms. VC entry time dummies 
is a collective term for t, (t+1), (t+2), (t+3) and (t+4→). 
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